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Abstract
ML-as-a-service is gaining popularity where a cloud server
hosts a trained model and offers prediction (inference) ser-
vice to users. In this setting, our objective is to protect the
confidentiality of both the users’ input queries as well as the
model parameters at the server, with modest computation and
communication overhead. Prior solutions primarily propose
fine-tuning cryptographic methods to make them efficient
for known fixed model architectures. The drawback with this
line of approach is that the model itself is never designed to
operate with existing efficient cryptographic computations.
We observe that the network architecture, internal functions,
and parameters of a model, which are all chosen during train-
ing, significantly influence the computation and communica-
tion overhead of a cryptographic method, during inference.
Based on this observation, we propose SOTERIA — a training
method to construct model architectures that are by-design ef-
ficient for private inference. We use neural architecture search
algorithms with the dual objective of optimizing the accuracy
of the model and the overhead of using cryptographic primi-
tives for secure inference. Given the flexibility of modifying
a model during training, we find accurate models that are also
efficient for private computation. We select garbled circuits
as our underlying cryptographic primitive, due to their expres-
siveness and efficiency, but this approach can be extended
to hybrid multi-party computation settings. We empirically
evaluate SOTERIA on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, to com-
pare with the prior work. Our results confirm that SOTERIA
is indeed effective in balancing performance and accuracy.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are susceptible to several security
and privacy attacks throughout their training and inference
pipelines. Defending each of these threats require different
types of security mechanisms. The most important require-
ment is that the sensitive input data as well as the trained
model parameters remains confidential at all times. In this
paper, we focus on private computation of inference over deep
neural networks, which is the setting of machine learning-as-
a-service. Consider a server that provides a machine learning
service (e.g., classification), and a client who needs to use
the service for an inference on her data record. The server is
not willing to share the proprietary machine learning model,
underpinning her service, with any client. The clients are also
unwilling to share their sensitive private data with the server.
We consider an honest-but-curious threat model. In addition,
we assume the two parties do not trust, nor include, any third
entity in the protocol. In this setting, our first objective is to
design a secure protocol that protects the confidentiality of
client data as well as the prediction results against the server
who runs the computation. The second objective is to pre-
serve the confidentiality of the model parameters with respect
to the client. We emphasize that the protection against the
indirect inference attacks that aim at reconstructing model
parameters [41] or its training data [39], by exploiting model
predictions, is not our goal.
A number of techniques provide data confidentiality while
computing and thereby allow private computation. The tech-
niques include computation on trusted processors such as
Intel SGX [22,31], and computation on encrypted data, using
homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, secret sharing, and
hybrid cryptographic approaches that jointly optimize the effi-
ciency of private inference on neural networks [3,6,16,45,46].
To provide private inference with minimal performance over-
head and accuracy loss, the dominant line of research involves
adapting cryptographic functions to (an approximation of) a
given fixed model [7, 24, 28–30, 35–37]. However, the alterna-
tive approach of searching or designing a network architecture
for a given set of efficient and known cryptographic primitives
is unexplored in the literature.
Our Contributions. In this work, we approach the prob-
lem of privacy-preserving inference from a novel perspective.
Instead of modifying cryptographic schemes to support neu-
ral network computations, we advocate modification of the
training algorithms for efficient cryptographic primitives. Re-
search has shown that training algorithms for deep learning
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PHE FHE SS GMW GC
Expressiveness × X X X X
Efficiency X × X X X
Communication
(One time setup) X X × × X
Table 1: Properties of secure computation cryptographic prim-
itives: Partially and fully homomorphic encryption schemes
(PHE, FHE), Goldreich-Micali-Widgerson protocol (GMW),
arithmetic secret sharing (SS), and Yao’s garbled circuit (GC).
are inherently flexible with respect to their neural network
architecture. This means that different network configurations
can achieve similar level of prediction accuracy. We exploit
this fact about deep learning algorithms and investigate the
problem of optimizing deep learning algorithms to ensure
efficient private computation.
To this end, we present SOTERIA — an approach for con-
structing deep neural networks optimized for performance,
accuracy and confidentiality. Among all the available crypto-
graphic primitives, we use garbled circuits as our main build-
ing block to address the confidentiality concern in the design
of SOTERIA. Garbled circuits are known to be efficient and al-
low generation of constant depth circuits even for non-linear
function which is not possible with other primitives such
as GMW or FHE. We show that neural network algorithms
can be optimized to efficiently execute garbled circuits while
acheiving high accuracy guarantees. We observe that the ef-
ficiency of evaluating an inference circuit depends on two
key factors: the model parameters and the network structure.
With this observation, we design a regularized architecture
search algorithm to construct neural networks. SOTERIA se-
lects optimal parameter sparsity and network structure with
the objective to guarantee acceptable performance on garbled
circuits and high model accuracy.
2 Selecting the Cryptographic Primitive
In designing SOTERIA, we make several design choices with
the goal of achieving efficiency. The most important among
them is the selection of the underlying cryptographic prim-
itive to ensure privacy of data. Several cryptographic prim-
itives such as partially homomorphic encryption schemes
(PHE) and fully homomorphic encryption schemes (FHE),
Goldreich-Micali-Widgerson protocol (GMW), arithmetic se-
cret sharing (SS), and Yao’s garbled circuit (GC) have been
proposed to enable two-party secure computation. Each of
these primitives perform differently with respect to the factors
such as efficiency, functionality, required resources and so on.
PHE schemes allow either addition or multiplication opera-
tions but not both on encrypted data [13,32]. In contrast, FHE
schemes enable both addition and multiplication on encrypted
data [6, 15, 16, 43] but incur huge performance overhead. SS
involves distributing the secret shares among non-trusting
parties such that any operation can be computed on encrypted
data without revealing the individual inputs of each party [3].
GMW [17] and GC [45] allow designing boolean circuits
and evaluating them between a client and a server. The dif-
ferences between these schemes might make it difficult to
decide which primitive is the best fit for designing a privacy-
preserving system for a particular application. Therefore, we
first outline the desirable properties specifically for private
neural network inference and then compare these primitives
with respect to these properties (see Table 1). We select a
cryptographic scheme that satisfies all our requirements.
Expressiveness. This property ensures that the crypto-
graphic primitive supports encrypted computation for a vari-
ety of operations. With the goal to enable private computation
for neural networks, we examine the type of computations
required in deep learning algorithms. Neural network algo-
rithms are composed of linear and non-linear operations. Lin-
ear operations include computation required in the execution
of fully-connected and convolution layers. Non-linear opera-
tions include activation functions such as Tanh, Sigmoid and
ReLU. The research in deep learning is at its peak with a
plethora of new models being proposed by the community to
improve the accuracy of various tasks. Hence, we desire that
the underlying primitive should be expressive with respect to
any new operations used in the future as well. PHE schemes
offer limited operations (either addition or multiplication) on
encrypted data. This limits their usage in applications that
demand expressive functionalities such as neural network al-
gorithms. Alternative approaches such as FHE, SS, GMW
and GC protocols allow arbitrary operations.
Computation Efficiency. Efficiency is one of the key fac-
tors while designing a client-server application such as a neu-
ral network inference service on the cloud. FHE techniques
have shown to incur orders of magnitude overhead for com-
putation of higher-degree polynmials or non-linear functions.
Existing approaches using FHE schemes have restricted its
use to compute only linear functions. However, most of the
neural network architectures such as CNNs have each linear
layer followed by a non-linear layer. To handle non-linear
operations, previous solutions either approximate them to
linear functions or switch to cryptographic primitives that
support non-linearlity [12, 24, 29, 30]. Approximation of non-
linear functions such as ReLU highly impacts the accuracy
of the model. Switching between schemes introduces addi-
tional computation cost which is directly proportional to the
network size. In comparison to FHE, research has shown that
SS, GMW and GC schemes provide constructions with rea-
sonable computation overhead for both linear and non-linear
operations.
Communication Overhead. The communication costs in-
curred for private computation contribute to the decision of
2
selecting our cryptographic primitive, as the network should
not become a bottleneck in the execution of the private ma-
chine learning as a service. We expect the client and server
to interact only once during the setup phase and at the end
of the execution to receive the output. We aim to remain
backward compatible to the existing cloud service setting
where the client does not need to be online at all time between
the request and response. In contradiction to this property,
the GMW scheme requires communication rounds propor-
tional to the depth of the circuit. To evaluate every layer with
an AND gate, the client and server have to exchange secrets
among them forcing the client to be online throughout the exe-
cution. Similarly, construction of non-linear bitwise functions
with arithmetic secret shares require communication rounds
logarithmic to the number of bits in the input. This makes the
use of these schemes almost infeasible in the cloud setting
that have a high-latency network. Unlike these primitives,
Yao’s garbled circuits combined with recent optimizations
require an exchange of data only once at the beginning of the
protocol.
We select GC as our underlying cryptographic primitive
in SOTERIA as it satisfies all the desired properties for a
designing private inference for cloud service applications.
3 Garbled Circuit for Efficient Neural-
Networks
We investigate the problem of performing private inference
on neural networks. Let W be the model parameters stored
on the server, x be the client’s input, y be the expected output
and f is the inference function to be computed. Given this,
we want to compute f (x;θ)→ y. We aim for the following
main goals:
• Confidentiality: The solution should preserve confiden-
tiality of the model parameters θ from the users and that
of x and y from the server. We assume an honest-but-
curious threat model.
• Accuracy: The drop in accuracy of the privately com-
puted inference function should be negligible as com-
pared to the accuracy of the model on plaintext data.
• Performance: The private computation should demon-
strate acceptable performance (runtime and communica-
tion) overhead.
Garbled circuits. GC protocol allows construction of any
function as a boolean circuit with a one time setup cost of
data exchange [46]. In our setting, the client is the garbler
and the server is the evaluator. In the setup phase, the client
first transforms the function into a boolean circuit with two-
input gates. The function (model architecture) and the circuit
are known to both the parties, but its parameters and input
are private. The client then garbles the circuit. This process
involves creating a garbled computation table (GCT), which is
an encrypted version of the truth table for the boolean circuit.
The entries for this table are randomly permuted, so that the
order does not leak information. The client then shares the
garbled circuit and its encrypted inputs to the circuit (binary
values representing x) with the server. In the next phase, the
parties perform an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [34], so
the server obtains the encryption of its inputs to the circuit
(binary values representing W ), without leaking information
about its parameters to the client. Then, the server evaluates
the circuit, and obtains the output value which is encrypted.
The server transfers the output to the client which can match
the encrypted values to their plaintext and obtain f (x;θ).
Performance. In GC, the communication and computation
overhead is directly dependent on the number of AND, OR
gates in the boolean circuit. Prior research has proposed sev-
eral techniques that make it free for the GC to execute XOR,
XNOR and NOT gates [25]. Given this prior work, the com-
munication overhead of the GC protocol for a given circuit
is proportional to its security parameter and the number of
non-XOR gates in the circuit. The total runtime for evaluating
a circuit is the sum of the time required during the online
(evaluation) and offline (garbling and oblivious transfer) com-
putation.
Efficient neural networks. In SOTERIA, we leverage the
above-mentioned properties of GC to design an optimized
neural network algorithm. Neural network algorithms are
shown to be flexible with respect to their architectures i.e.,
multiple models with different configuration can achieve a
similar level of accuracy. We take advantage of this observa-
tion and propose designing neural network architectures that
help optimize the performance of executing inference with
garbled circuits. The number of gates in a circuit correspond-
ing to a neural network depends on its activation functions
and the size of its parameter vector.
Neural networks have shown to exhibit relatively high ac-
curacy for various tasks even with low precision parameters.
Binary neural networks [21] are designed with the lowest
possible size for each parameter, i.e., one bit to represent
{−1,+1} values. Using BNNs naturally aligns with our se-
lected cryptographic primitive because each wire in garbled
circuits represents 1 bit value (representing −1 in the model
with 0 in the circuit). Binarizing the model parameters further
allows us to heavily use the free XOR, XNOR and NOT gates
in garbled circuits, thus minimizing the computation and com-
munication overhead of private inference. This has recently
been shown in the performance evaluation of garbled circuits
on binary neural networks [35].
In neural networks, linear functions such as those used in
the convolutional or fully connected layers form an impor-
tant part of the network. These functions involve dot prod-
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uct vector multiplications. Instead of using multiplications,
this can be computed very efficiently using XNOR-popcount:
x ·w = 2×bitcount(xnor(x,w))−N, where N = |x|. In bi-
nary neural networks, the output of activation functions is
also binary. But, the output of XNOR-popcount is not a bi-
nary number, thus, according to BNN algorithms one would
need to compare it with 0; positive numbers will be converted
to 1 and negative numbers will be converted to 0.
We can compute some non-linear functions such as max-
pool very efficiently in BNNs. Max-pooling is a simple oper-
ation which returns the maximum value from a vector, which
in the case of neural networks is usually a one-dimensional
representation of a 2D max-pooling window. In binary neural
networks, maxpool need to simply return 1 if there is a 1 in
the vector. This is achieved by a logical OR-operation over
the elements of the vector.
To achieve a learning capacity for binary neural networks
similar to full-precision models, we would need to scale up
the the number of model parameters. We can increase the
number of kernels in a convolution layer and the number of
nodes in a fully connected layer, by a given scaling factor.
This technique has been used in the prior work [35], and
enables learning more accurate models, however at the cost
of increasing the number of computations in the network.
4 SOTERIA
All the techniques which we discuss in Section 3, can help
in reducing the overhead of the garbled circuit protocol on a
neural network. However, besides the size of model parame-
ters, which is reduced in binary neural networks, the model
size and its structure also play significant roles in determining
the number of non-XOR gates in the garbled circuit of neural
networks. For example, the configurations of the convolu-
tional layers directly affects the overhead of garbled circuits
on neural networks. Besides, not all model parameters are
of the same value for the machine learning task, and models
with the same structure but with larger sparsity can result in
similar accuracy, but significantly lower overhead for private
computation.
In this paper, we design SOTERIA to automatically learn
the model architecture and its connections so as to optimize
the cost of private inference in addition to optimizing accu-
racy. This is a different approach than simply fine-tunning
or compressing a model, as we aim at including the cost of
private computation as part of the objective of architecture
learning and parameter learning of the model. To this end,
we build SOTERIA on top of two well-established classes of
machine learning algorithms to search for the models that
balance accuracy and performance: neural architecture search
algorithms, and ternary neural network algorithms.
4.1 Neural architecture search for construct-
ing efficient models for private inference
Architecture search algorithms for neural networks are de-
signed to replace the manual design of complex deep models.
The objective is to learn the model structure for which we
hope to obtain a high accuracy when trained on the training set.
A number of such algorithms are designed recently. NAS [14]
is one of the first neural architecture search algorithms. It
comprises of three components — a search space which is
the domain of architectures over which the search will be
executed, the search strategy, which defines how the search
space has to be explored, and a performance estimator, to
estimate the performance of a particular discovered architec-
ture on unseen data. Multiple techniques have been proposed
to minimize the computation cost of the search process, by
tweaking the search strategy and the performance estimator
such as ENAS and DARTS [27, 33, 47]. DARTS is a differen-
tiable neural architecture search algorithm, which is orders of
magnitude faster than other search algorithms [27]. DARTS
automatically constructs the model architecture by stacking a
number of cells. Each cell is a directed acyclic graph, where
each node is a neural operation (e.g., convolution with differ-
ent dimensions, maxpool, identity). The architecture search
algorithm learns the optimal construction of cells that would
maximize the accuracy of the model on some validation set.
During the search algorithm, we use stochastic gradient de-
scent to continuously update the probability of using different
candidate operations for each connection in the internal graph
of a cell. These probabilities reflect the usefulness of each
operation for different positions in the cell. Let α(i, j)o be the
fitting score associated with operation o to connect nodes i
and j in the directed acyclic graph inside the cell. The proba-
bility of choosing a particular operation to connect node i to j
is computed as a softmax of the score α(i, j)o over all possible
operations.
In SOTERIA, we modify the computation of the α(i, j)o scores
over candidate operations. In order to include the cost of pri-
vate inference, we penalize each operation proportional to its
computation and communication overhead. Let γ(o) be the
penalty or the cost function for an operation o. The penalty fac-
tor could be the normalized runtime and communication cost
of an operation, which can be computed empirically on gar-
bled operations. In our experiments, we compute the penalty
factor for different operations in Table 6. We update the fit-
ting score α(i, j)o by replacing it with α
(i, j)
o (1−λγ(o)), where
λ is our regularization term. Larger values of λ would result
in models that prefer training efficient models over accurate
models.
By regularizing the architecture search algorithm, we effec-
tively guide the algorithm to identify a configuration for cells
which optimize both model accuracy and performance of pri-
vate inference. This enables fine-tuning the model before be-
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ing trained to be efficient on our cryptographic primitives. As
we balance the trade-off between accuracy and performance,
SOTERIA can construct models which by design satisfy the
requirements of our system. In our experiments, we evalu-
ate the performance of models under different values of λ,
and how this factor can be used to balance different costs of
confidentiality for neural networks.
4.2 Ternary (Sparse Binary) Neural Network
For building a system that enables efficient private inference,
we prefer to reduce the number of parameters in the network.
One approach is to train a model and then compress the model,
however, that might not result in the best construction of the
model as far as the model accuracy is concerned. Besides, to
be aligned with our approach of constructing model architec-
tures, we would prefer to learn model structures which are
sparse. One well-established machine learning technique is to
learn a model with ternary values (−1,0,+1). This effectively
means that some of the network connections (parameters) are
removed (for parameters with value 0). Ternary neural net-
works try to minimize the distance between the full precision
model parameters and their ternary values [26].
In building models for SOTERIA, we train models with
ternary parameters and binary activation functions. This
would enable us to still use the techniques for binary neu-
ral networks, as discussed in Section 3, however on a smaller
circuit (due to the model’s sparsity). We incorporate ternary
neural networks into our regularized architecture search al-
gorithm to find cells containing only ternary convolution and
max-pooling layers that operate on binary inputs and ternary
parameters.
The procedure for converting full precision model parame-
ters, during training, to ternary involves comparing the model
parameters with a threshold in the forward pass of the gradi-
ent descent algorithm. We follow the established algorithms
in this domain [26]. For the parameters Wi in an operation, we
convert the parameter to +1 when it is larger than threshold
∆, we set it to −1 if it is smaller than −∆, and we set it to
0 otherwise. The threshold is computed as ∆= 0.7n ∑
n
i=1 |Wi|.
Output of the functions are also binarized similarly, by com-
paring them with 0, where positive values are converted to
+1, and the negative values are converted to −1. All these
transformations happen during the model training, so the final
model is optimal given the ternary restrictions. Besides, the
training algorithm finds the optimal level of sparsity for the
model which does not conflict with its accuracy.
5 Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate the efficiency of our method in two ways. We
show how using ternary neural networks on fixed model archi-
tectures, as used in the prior work, can reduce the overhead
of secure inference on neural networks. This is due to the
sparsity of such models. We also present the performance of
SOTERIA architectures, in which model complexity is opti-
mized along with the model accuracy.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate our work on MNIST and CIFAR10 image clas-
sification datasets, as they have been extensively used in the
literature to evaluate the performance of cryptographically
secure neural network schemes. We run our experiments on
an AWS c5.2xlarge instance, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS on
an Intel Xeon 8124M at 3.0 GHz.
We use PyTorch 1.3 [1], a python-based deep learning
framework to implement our architecture search algorithm
and train the ternary models. We use Synopsys Design Com-
piler [2], version L-2016.03-SP5-2, to synthesize SystemVer-
ilog code into the gate-level netlist. Our synthesis runs the
TinyGarble gate library infrastructure1.
We execute the garbled circuit protocol on the boolean cir-
cuit generated as described in previous sections. We compute
the number of non-XOR gates in the generated boolean circuit
netlist as a measure of its complexity. We measure the exact
performance of SOTERIA as its runtime during the offline and
online phases of the protocol, and its communication cost.
We present the experimental setup of prior work and SOTE-
RIA, including their CPU specification and link to available
software codes, in Table 2. We also present the details of all
neural network architectures which we evaluate in this paper
in Table 8 in Appendix A.
5.2 Ternary Neural Networks
As discussed in section 4.2, we use ternary neural networks
(TNNs) instead of binary networks as it provides significant
performance gains with GC without any post-processing (i.e.,
the model is trained to be sparse). We perform two small
experiments to illustrate the benefit of the sparsity (fraction
of parameters with weight 0) of ternary models. Further, we
analyze the effect of the scale of the network in the tradeoff
between model accuracy and performance of private infer-
ence.
Sparsity. Figure 1 shows the number of non-XOR gates
for a toy example: a 4-kernel 3× 3 convolution operation
taking input of size 32×32×3 with padding sized 1 ternary
neural network. We randomly set a fraction of parameters to
zero to manually control the sparsity of the model. A BNN
model is equivalent to the case where the sparsity is 0. We
observe that as the sparsity increases the number of non-XOR
gates decrease with almost the same factor. This can result in
reducing both the communication overhead and the inference
runtime, as we will see in training large models.
1We use TinyGarble with 21ecca7cb75b33fd7508771fd35f03657dd44e5e
gitid on https://github.com/esonghori/TinyGarble master branch.
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Table 2: Overview of the existing private inference methods, including the cryptographic schemes used, precision of neural
networks supported, number of parties involved, evaluation setup configuration and availability of code.
Prior Work CryptographicScheme Model Precision Parties
Performance Evaluation Setup Code
CPU CPU Mark(Single Thread)f
Relative
CPU Mark
MiniONN [28] Additively HE,
GC
Full 2
Server: Intel Core i5
4 × 3.30 GHz cores
Client: Intel Core i5
4 × 3.20 GHz cores
1,686-2,300 0.61-0.83 Availablea
EzPC [7] GC,
Additive SS
Full 2
Intel Xeon E5-2673 v3
2.40GHz
1,723 0.62 Availableb
DeepSecure [37] GC 16-bit
fixed-point
2
Intel Core i7-2600
3.40GHz
1,737 0.63 –
SecureML [30] Linear HE,
GC
Full 2
AWS c4.8xlarge
(Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3
2.90 GHz)
1,918 0.69 –
Gazelle [24] Additively HE,
GC
Full 2
AWS c4.xlarge
(Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3
2.90GHz)
1,918 0.69 –
Delphi [29] Additively HE,
GC
Full 2
AWS c5.2xlarge
(Intel Xeon 8000 series
3.0 GHz)
2,082 0.75 Availablec
SOTERIA GC Ternary 2
AWS c5.2xlarge
(Intel Xeon 8124M
3.0 GHz)
2,082 0.75 Availabled
Chameleon [36]
GC,
GMW,
Additive SS
Full 3e
Intel Core i7-4790
3.60GHz
2,266 0.82 –
XONN [35] GC Binary 2 Intel Core i7-7700k
4.5GHz
2,777 1.0 –
a MiniONN: https://github.com/SSGAalto/minionn
b EzPC: https://github.com/mpc-msri/EzPC
c Delphi: https://github.com/mc2-project/delphi
d SOTERIA: https://github.com/privacytrustlab/soteria_private_nn_inference
e Chameleon only uses the third party in pre-processing stage.
f CPU mark: The configurations are listed with their the single-threaded CPU Mark scores as reported by cpubenchmark.
net/singleThread.html. These single-thread benchmarks test processors on a variety of tasks, from floating point
operations, string sorting and data compression (https://www.cpubenchmark.net/cpu_test_info.html) to provide an
estimate of the capabilities of a processor. As microarchitectural optimizations vary from processor to processor, frequency
alone cannot be used as a performance metric. The absolute scores and relative scores (compared to the highest scoring CPU
in the table) for CPUs used in evaluation of related work are reported.
Note that while training a TNN, we cannot control the spar-
sity of the network. In Table 4, we show the result of training
binary and ternary models on MNIST dataset, model archi-
tecture m3. The table reports the GC costs of the components
of the network for both BNNs and TNNs. We can observe
that the ternary model has a significant sparsity (about 0.3).
This results in constructing smaller circuits for the model,
which reduces the inference cost of using GC protocol over
ternary neural networks. This is reflected in the smaller num-
ber of non-XOR gates in the ternary circuits constructed on
convolution and fully connected operations. The costs for
maxpool operation will remain the same, as it does not have
any learnable parameter.
Scale. As discussed in Section 3, we need to scale the net-
work operations to achieve a higher capacity for binary and
ternary models and obtain better accuracies. Figure 2 demon-
strates the impact of scale of the network on accuracy of the
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Figure 1: Sparsity of a model versus its circuit complexity. We
measure sparsity as the fraction of model parameters with 0
weight. We quantify circuit complexity as the number of non-
XOR gates. The numbers are computed on a ternary neural
network with a 3× 3 convolution operation with 4 kernels
and a 32× 32× 3 input. For this experiment, we assign 0
weights to a random set of parameters, to get different levels
of sparsity and corresponding number of non-XOR gates.
Table 3: Number of parameters and corresponding sparsity
and trained model test accuracy for MNIST (m1) architecture
with various levels of scaling factor. The table reports the
statistics of the experiment in Figure 2.
Scaling
Factor
Total no. of
Parameters
No. of
0-weights Sparsity Accuracy
0.25 26,432 5,946 0.22 0.9063
0.50 54,912 13,058 0.24 0.9413
0.75 85,440 18,703 0.22 0.9544
1.00 118,016 25,317 0.21 0.9579
1.50 189,312 43,428 0.23 0.9618
2.00 268,800 58,040 0.22 0.9658
2.50 356,480 83,451 0.23 0.9676
3.00 452,352 107,343 0.24 0.9712
model and its GC runtime for private inference. Although
inference time increases linearly with the scaling factor, ac-
curacy improves upto a certain extent with scaling (scaling
factor of 1) and then becomes almost constant. This denotes
that we can select a sweet spot for scaling factor thereby opti-
mizing for both accuracy and performance.
Table 3 shows how scaling factor affects the number of
parameters in the network. As the scaling factor in TNNs
increases, the accuracy increases. However, with diminish-
ing returns after a certain limit. The inference cost of the
circuit also increases, as is evident from the growth of run-
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Figure 2: Test accuracy versus inference runtime for a ternary
neural network trained on a fixed MNIST (m1) architecture,
in various scale. See Appendix A for description of the model.
time with change in scaling factor. Note that the sparsity is
about 0.24 for scaling factor 3 for the ternary neural network,
which means that the effective size of the model (hence its
performance cost) remains comparable to a binary neural net-
work (without any scaling), albiet with better accuracy. As a
reference, the test accuracy of a BNN model with the same
architecture is 0.9514.
Comparison with prior work. Table 5 reports the results
of our experiments when compared to prior work. In this
subsection, we present the outcome of basic SOTERIA on
fixed model architectures which are used in the literature,
thus only discussing the effect of sparsity of ternary neural
networks on the tradeoff between accuracy and performance
costs. We use three different architectures for each of the two
datasets, which have been used in existing work. m1-3 are
used with the MNIST dataset, while m4-6 are used with the
CIFAR10 dataset. See Appendix A for the descriptions of
model architectures. We use the same scaling factors for our
networks as used by XONN [35], which is the only other
comparable work with quantized (binary) weights and inputs,
for a fair comparison.
We observe that for MNIST datasets, the basic TNN SOTE-
RIA models (m1-m3) provide better runtime and communica-
tion performance on average than prior work with maximum
drop in accuracy of only 0.016 (for model m3). This shows
that SOTERIA is useful in designing custom models that pro-
vide optimal performance guarantees while retaining high
prediction accuracy. For CIFAR10 datasets, we observe that
for models used in prior work (m4 to m6), our basic TNN
models exhibit a slightly higher drop in accuracy of 0.8, but
provide a computation and communication gain, on average,
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Table 4: Performance of private inference on garbled circuit models with binary versus ternary parameters. We show the
independent offline and online runtimes, communication costs and number of non-XOR gates for three different types of
operations. The operations are taken from MNIST (m3) network, trained in both binary (BNN) and ternary (TNN) configurations
using a scaling factor of 1.
Operation Type Size
Runtime (ms) Communication
(KB)
Number of
non-XOR gates TNNSparsityOffline Online Total
BNN TNN BNN TNN BNN TNN BNN TNN BNN TNN
Convolution
Input: 12×12×16
Padding: 0
Window: 5×5
Kernels: 16
39.16 28.27 52.87 38.17 92.03 66.43 2,572 1,876 589,824 425,558 0.27
Maxpool
Input: 8×8×16
Window: 2×2 0.35 0.57 0.92 34 768 N.A.
Fully
Connected
Input: 100
Nodes: 10
0.49 0.34 0.83 0.60 1.32 0.94 68 47 3150 2246 0.35
as compared to prior work. Overall, our results show that
SOTERIA provides a flexible approach of training private
models given the constraint on performance and accuracy of
the model.
5.3 Architecture Search
We present the details of our empirical analysis of SOTERIA.
In particular, we evaluate the cost function we used in the
architecture search algorithm, the effect of the performance
regularization during the search, the effect of the model size
on the tradeoff between accuracy and inference runtime, and
compare SOTERIA with the prior work.
Implementation. To handle conversion of the model into a
digital circuit supported by TinyGarble, we first build a rep-
resentation of the model and parameters in SystemVerilog,
and then synthesize and optimize our circuit (using Synopsys
Design Compiler) to use circuit elements supported by Tiny-
Garble. In this first step, we designed a collection of param-
eterized components (notably dot product, and maxpool) to
use as building blocks our architecture search algorithm. Each
component is flexibly designed to efficiently accept arbitrary
size input and output, and is composed to form the complete
model. In a general setting, hardware-level code is typically
straight-forward to generate. However, to enable TNNs with
SOTERIA, we have to dynamically define the sparsity of the
modules depending on the result of model training and archi-
tecture search. Along with the parameter data, we define the
sparsity information which is used during generate phases
in SystemVerilog to build the sparse network in hardware
(taking advantage of the 0-valued parameters of the model).
Altogether, this allows us to build and evaluate the models
constructed by SOTERIA.
Cost function for regularized architecture search. As pre-
sented in Section 4, our algorithm searches for the models
that are not only accurate but also are efficient with respect
to the costs of using garbled circuits on the model architec-
ture. For this, we modify the score value that the DARTS
architecture search algorithm gives to each operation (e.g.,
maxpool, or convolution with different dimensions) with a
regularized penalty factor proportional to the performance
cost of the operation. Table 6 presents the communication and
runtime cost of each operation that we use in our algorithm.
The penalty factor is computed as the average of the relative
communication cost and relative runtime cost of each opera-
tion, with respect to the most costly operation (CONV5×5).
We use this penalty factor in the experiments.
Balancing accuracy and inference costs. For the architec-
ture search in SOTERIA, we balance accuracy and inference
cost over GC protocol, using a regularization factor λ. With
λ= 1 the importance of the penalty factor is maximum, and
λ= 0 represents the case where we ignore the performance
cost. We execute the search process with different values of
lambda. We constrain the search to finding a 3-cell architec-
ture for CIFAR10 dataset and 1-cell architecture for MNIST
dataset, with each cell having 4 operations in sequence. We
run the architecture search algorithm for 100 epochs, and
subsequently train the obtained architectures for 200 epochs.
Figure 3 presents trade-off between test accuracy of the
optimal architectures and their inference runtime. Table 7 pro-
vides the statistics on the number of model parameters and
the model sparsity for different values of λ for the MNIST
dataset. As λ increases, cheaper operations, that have fewer
trainable parameters are chosen by the search process, which
improves the inference runtime at the expense of the model
accuracy. As we observe, λ = 0.6 can provide a reasonable
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Table 5: Performance analysis of existing secure schemes for private neural network inference. We compare SOTERIA constructed
on fixed model architectures with ternary parameters, as well as optimal architectures constructed by SOTERIA, with the prior
work. We provide the descriptions of the model architectures in Appendix A). We use the same scaling factor for SOTERIA and
XONN for fixed model architectures (1.75 for m1, 4.0 for m2, 2.0 for m3, 2.0 for m4, 3.0 for m5, 2.0 for m6), and use 3.0 for
MNIST (SOTERIA) and CIFAR10 (SOTERIA) for the models constructed by our architecture search algorithm.
Model Secure Scheme Runtime (s) Communication (MB) Test Accuracy
Offline Online Total
MNIST (m1)
SecureML [30] 4.7 0.18 4.88 −d 0.931
MiniONN [28] 0.9 0.14 1.04 15.8 0.976
EzPC [7] − −c 0.7 76 0.976
Gazelle [24] 0 0.03 0.03 0.5 0.976
XONN [35] − −c 0.13b 4.29 0.976a (0.9591)
SOTERIA (TNN) 0.04 0.03 0.07 3.72 0.9642
MNIST (m2)
DeepSecure [37] 7.69 1.98 9.67 791 0.9895
MiniONN 0.88 0.4 1.28 47.6 0.9895
EzPC − −c 0.6 70 0.990
Gazelle 0.15 0.05 0.20 8.0 0.990
XONN − −c 0.16b 38.28 0.9864a (0.9718)
SOTERIA (TNN) 0.08 0.06 0.14 30.68 0.9733
MNIST (m3)
MiniONN 3.58 5.74 9.32 657.5 0.990
EzPC − −c 5.1 501 0.990
Gazelle 0.48 0.33 0.81 70 0.990
XONN − −c 0.15b 32.13 0.990a (0.9672)
SOTERIA (TNN) 0.08 0.07 0.15 26.04 0.9740
MNIST (SOTERIA) SOTERIA (λ= 0.6) 0.09 0.08 0.17 36.24 0.9883SOTERIA (λ= 0) 0.016 0.018 0.034 95.18 0.9811
CIFAR10 (m4) XONN − −
c 15.07b 4980 0.80a (0.7197)
SOTERIA (TNN) 8.56 6.14 14.70 936.1 0.7314
CIFAR10 (m5)
MiniONN 472 72 544 9272 0.8161
EzPC − −c 265.6 40683 0.8161
Gazelle 9.34 3.56 12.9 1236 0.8161
Delphie 45 1 46 200 0.85
XONN − −c 5.79b 2599 0.8185a (0.7266)
SOTERIA (TNN) 3.48 2.95 6.43 461.3 0.7252
CIFAR10 (m6) XONN − −
c 16.09b 5320 0.83a (0.7341)
SOTERIA (TNN) 9.01 6.63 15.64 982.7 0.7396
CIFAR10 (SOTERIA) SOTERIA (λ= 0.6) 3.69 3.26 6.95 497.6 0.7384SOTERIA (λ= 0) 4.01 3.53 7.54 561.2 0.7211
aWe could not reproduce the test accuracies for XONN. We report the results that we obtained on the same
model architectures with the same setting in the respective paper in parenthesis.
bXONN’s runtime reported by the authors is measured on a high-performance Intel processor, which is faster
than the one used by all other methods.
cBreakdown of runtime cost into offline and online runtime is not reported by the authors.
dCommunication cost is not reported by the authors.
eThe runtime, communication cost and test accuracy are visual estimates from the graphs reported by the authors.
balance between both accuracy and the inference cost. This
is where the search algorithm identifies cheaper operations
that collectively can result in equivalent accuracy that can
be achieved using more expensive operations. It is very im-
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Table 6: Runtime and communication cost of each operation
based on their garbled circuit inference. We also calculate the
performance penalty factor (which we use in our regularized
architecture search algorithm) as the average of the relative
costs for each unit w.r.t the most expensive operation.
Operation Runtime(ms)
Comm.
(KB)
Penalty
factor
CONV5×5 55.40 7942 1.00
CONV3×3 23.10 3190 0.41
MAXPOOL2×2 3.23 145 0.04
IDENTITY 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 7: Number of parameters and corresponding sparsity
and test accuracy with different levels of λ for SOTERIA ar-
chitecture search over MNIST dataset with 1 cell architecture
having 4 sequential operations. The setting is the same as
the one illustrated in Figure 3(b). The scaling factor is 3. For
larger λ, the algorithm penalizes constructing large models.
λ Total no. ofParameters
No. of
0-weights Sparsity Accuracy
1.0 133,032 41,212 0.31 0.8892
0.8 729,768 200,540 0.27 0.9721
0.6 2,904,168 1,080,217 0.37 0.9883
0.4 2,904,168 1,080,217 0.37 0.9883
0.2 2,941,032 895,034 0.30 0.9887
0.0 11,466,600 5,116,030 0.45 0.9811
portant to note that selecting λ depends on how much cost
or accuracy drop we can tolerate for a given setting. Thus,
SOTERIA enables adapting private inference to the specific
requirements and limitations of a system.
Finding the optimal depth for the model (number of cells).
The number of cells that the final architecture will have is
a manually-set hyperparameter, that practically defines the
depth of the model architecture. We perform an experiment
on the CIFAR10 dataset, using cells with 4 operations in
sequence and λ = 0.6. We run the search process for 100
epochs, and train each resultant architecture for 200 epochs.
Figure 4 presents the results of executing the search with
different number of cells. It illustrates the model accuracies
along with their inference runtime.
We can observe that for a single cell architecture, the ac-
curacy levels are low, as the network could not process the
features required to perform a generalizable classification.
The test accuracy peaks for 3-cell architecture, suggesting
that it has enough operations to process the required features
of the inputs. In parallel, we can see that as the number of
cells increases, the runtime also increases.
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Figure 3: Inference runtime versus test accuracy of a garbled
ternary model, constructed with SOTERIAarchitecture search
algorithm, for various values of circuit cost regularization λ.
We obtain the architecture for a neural network with (a) 3
cells for CIFAR10 dataset, and (b) 1 cell for MNIST dataset.
All experiments use a scaling factor of 3.
Comparison with prior work. Table 5 reports the results for
SOTERIA trained models that are optimized for both accuracy
and efficiency. For the MNIST dataset, we observe that our
model with λ= 0 gives the best model as compared to prior
work while balancing the runtime performance (0.034) and
accuracy of 0.9811. Increasing λ = 0.6 increases the accu-
racy by a small value. Similarly, for CIFAR10 datasets, we
observe that a SOTERIA-trained model with λ = 0.6 gives
better accuracy than prior work as compared to the numbers
reported in brackets. In addition, SOTERIA models provide ac-
ceptable runtime performance and communication overhead
that outperforms the results from prior work. Our evaluation
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Figure 4: Impact of the model’s depth (as the number of
cells in the SOTERIA architecture search algorithm) on test
accuracy and inference runtime of garbled ternary model on
CIFAR10. Regularization term λ is 0.6. Scaling factor is 3.
on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets confirm that SOTERIA is
effective in training models that are customized to perform
well for both performance and accuracy.
6 Related Work
There has been several approaches that introduce new tech-
niques for secure machine learning, or build up on existing
techniques by trying to optimize bottlenecks.
Homomorphic Encryption. In CryptoNets [12] [44], the
authors modify the neural network operation by using square
function as an activation and average pool instead of maxpool
to reduce the non-linear functions to low degree polynomial
to control the noise. Similar approaches of using homomor-
phic encryption on data and optimizing the machine learn-
ing operations to limit the noise have been explored exten-
sively [4, 5, 18].
Hesamifard et al. [20] explore using homomorphic en-
crypted data for training the neural networks. CryptoDL [19]
explores various activation functions with low polynomial
degree that can work well with homomorphic encrypted data
and proposed an activation using the derivative of ReLU func-
tion. However, using homomorphic encryption adds to an
additional computational overhead and most of the non-linear
activations cannot be effectively computed which results in a
degradation in reliability of the deep learning systems.
Secure Multiparty Computation. Secure multiparty com-
putation requires a very low computation overhead but re-
quires extensive communication between the parties. It has
been used for several machine learning operations. DeepSe-
cure [37] only uses GC to compute all the operations in the
neural network. They rely on pre-processing of the data by
reducing the dimensions to improve the performance and is
implemented on the TinyGarble [40] library. Chameleon [36]
uses a combination of arithmetic sharing, garbled circuit and
boolean sharing to compute the neural networks for secure
inference. They rely on third party server to perform compu-
tation in the offline phase resulting in better performance than
the previous work.
XONN [35] leverages Binary Neural Networks with GC.
Binarization dramatically reduces the inference latency for
the network compared to other frameworks that utilize full-
precision weights and inputs, as it converts matrix multipli-
cations into simple XNOR-popcounts. They use TinyGarble
library as well to implement the Boolean circuits for GC.
Prio [8] uses a secret sharing [38] based protocol to compute
aggregate statistics over private data from multiple sources.
They deploy a secret-shared non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof mechanism to verify whether data sent by clients is
well-formed, and then decode summed encodings of clients’
data to generate aggregate statistic. They extend the applica-
tion of Prio to foundational machine learning techniques such
as least squares regression.
Hybrid Schemes. A judicious combination of homomor-
phic encryption and multiparty computation protocol have
shown to give some additional benefits in terms of runtime
and communication costs. Gazelle [24] uses lattice based
Packed Additive homomorphic encryption to compute dot
product and convolution but relies on garbled circuits for im-
plementing non-linear operations like Maxpool and ReLU.
They reduce the overall bandwidth by packing ciphertexts
and re-encryption to refresh the noise budget. Delphi [29]
builds upon this work and uses Architecture Search to select
optimal replacement positions for expensive ReLU activation
function with a quadratic approximation with minimal loss in
accuracy.
MiniONN [28] pre-computes multiplication triplets using
homomorphic encryption for GMW protocol followed by
SPDZ [9, 10] protocol. The multiplication triplets are ex-
changed securely using additive homomorphic encryption
like Paillier or DGK. SecureML [30] uses garbled circuits
and additive homomorphic encryption to speed up some NN
operations. However, the conversion costs between of ho-
momorphic encryption and Yao’s garbled circuits is expen-
sive and the performance of homomorphic encryption scales
poorly with increasing security parameter [11].
Hence, we rely on only garbled circuit protocol to effi-
ciently compute neural network operations during inference
with low communication bandwidth, low computation com-
plexity and low memory footprint using binary neural net-
works while maintaining the accuracy. Most of the previous
work have relied heavily on optimizing the complex crypto-
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graphic operations to work well with the neural networks. We
show that it is possible to optimize the neural network to get
an efficient privacy preserving neural network architectures.
Trusted Computing. Some research uses trusted processors
where they assume that the underlying hardware is trustworthy
and outsource all the machine learning computations to the
trusted hardware. Chiron [22] is a training system for privacy-
preserving machine learning as a service which conceals the
training data from the operator. It uses Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) and runs the standard ML training in an
enclave and confines it in a Ryoan sandbox [23] to prevent it
from leaking the training data outside the enclave.
Ohrimenko et al. [31] propose a solution for secure multi-
party ML by using trusted Intel SGX-enabled processors and
used oblivious protocols between client and server where the
input and outputs are blinded. However, the memory of en-
claves is limited and it is difficult to process memory and com-
putationally intensive operations like matrix multiplication in
the enclaves with paralellism. To address this, Slalom [42] pro-
vides a methodology to outsource the matrix multiplication
to a faster untrusted processor and verify the computation.
7 Conclusions
We introduce SOTERIA, a system that takes advantage of the
power of neural architecture search algorithms in order to
design model architectures which jointly optimize accuracy
and efficiency for private inference. We use garbled circuits
(GC) as our cryptographic primitive, due to its flexibility.
However, other secure multi-party computation schemes can
also be used to enrich the set of secure operations that could
be chosen by the architecture search algorithm. .Instead of
model post-processing, we also enable the stochastic gradient
descent algorithm to train a sparse model (setting some pa-
rameters to 0), hence further improving the efficiency of the
trained model. To this end, we train ternary neural networks
which have shown to have a significant potential in learning
reasonably accurate models. We construct optimal architec-
tures that balance accuracy and inference efficiency on GC on
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. As opposed to the prior work
that build cryptographic schemes around given fixed models,
SOTERIA provides a flexible solution that can be adapted
to the accuracy and performance requirements of any given
system, and enables trading off between requirements.
Reproducibility
The code for our work is available at https://github.com/
privacytrustlab/soteria_private_nn_inference.
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A Specifications of the Model Architectures
Table 8: Model architectures used in our experiments. Models m1-6 are used in the prior work on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets,
and we constructed the SOTERIA models using our regularized architecture search algorithm.
Type Kernels/Nodes Type
Kernels/
Nodes Type
Kernels/
Nodes Type
Kernels/
Nodes
MNIST (m1) CIFAR10 (m5) CIFAR10 (SOTERIA) CIFAR10 (SOTERIA)
1 FC 128 1 CONV 3×3 16 λ= 0, No. of cells = 3,
No. of operations per cell = 4
λ= 0.6, No. of cells = 3,
No. of operations per cell = 42 FC 128 2 CONV 3×3 16
3 FC 10 3 CONV 3×3 16 1 CONV 5×5 16 1 CONV 3×3 16
4 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 2 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 2 CONV 3×3 16
MNIST (m2) 5 CONV 3×3 32 3 CONV 5×5 16 3 CONV 3×3 16
1 CONV 5×5 5 6 CONV 3×3 32 4 CONV 5×5 16 4 MAXPOOL 2×2 -
2 FC 100 7 CONV 3×3 32 5 CONV 5×5 32 5 CONV 3×3 32
3 FC 10 8 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 6 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 6 CONV 3×3 32
9 CONV 3×3 48 7 CONV 5×5 32 7 CONV 3×3 32
MNIST (m3) 10 CONV 3×3 48 8 CONV 5×5 32 8 MAXPOOL 2×2 -
1 CONV 5×5 16 11 CONV 3×3 64 9 CONV 5×5 64 9 CONV 3×3 64
2 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 12 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 10 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 10 CONV 3×3 64
3 CONV 5×5 16 13 FC 10 11 CONV 5×5 64 11 CONV 3×3 64
4 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 12 CONV 5×5 64 12 MAXPOOL 2×2 -
5 FC 100 CIFAR10 (m6) 13 FC 10 13 FC 10
6 FC 10 1 CONV 3×3 16
2 CONV 3×3 32 MNIST (SOTERIA) MNIST (SOTERIA)
CIFAR10 (m4) 3 CONV 3×3 32 λ= 0, No. of cells = 1,
No. of operations per cell = 4
λ= 0.6, No. of cells = 1,
No. of operations per cell = 41 CONV 3×3 64 4 MAXPOOL 2×2 -
2 CONV 3×3 64 5 CONV 3×3 48 1 CONV 5×5 16 1 CONV 3×3 16
3 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 6 CONV 3×3 64 2 CONV 5×5 16 2 CONV 3×3 16
4 CONV 3×3 64 7 CONV 3×3 80 3 CONV 5×5 16 3 MAXPOOL 2×2 -
5 CONV 3×3 64 8 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 4 CONV 5×5 16 4 CONV 5×5 16
6 MAXPOOL 2×2 - 9 CONV 3×3 96 5 FC 100 5 FC 100
7 CONV 3×3 64 10 CONV 3×3 96 6 FC 10 6 FC 10
8 CONV 1×1 64 11 CONV 3×3 128
9 CONV 1×1 16 12 MAXPOOL 2×2 -
10 FC 10 13 FC 10
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